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Volume I:  Technical Report 
1.0 Authorization and Notification 
Mr. Ralph Roe, the Director of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), requested an 
independent assessment of the anomalous gaseous hydrogen (GH2) flow incident on the Space 
Shuttle Program (SSP) Orbiter Vehicle (OV)-105 during the Space Transportation System 
(STS)-126 mission.  The main propulsion system (MPS) engine #2 GH2 flow control valve 
(FCV) LV-57 transition from low towards high flow position without being commanded.  Post-
flight examination revealed that the FCV LV-57 poppet had experienced a fatigue failure that 
liberated a section of the poppet flange.  The NESC assessment provided a peer review of the 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD), stress analysis, and impact testing.  A probability of 
detection (POD) study was requested by the SSP Orbiter Project for the eddy current (EC) 
nondestructive evaluation (NDE) techniques that were developed to inspect the flight FCV 
poppets. 
An out-of-board activity was approved February 5, 2009.  The final report was presented to the 
NESC Review Board (NRB) for approval on March 3, 2011.  
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4.0 Executive Summary 
Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Orbiter Vehicle (OV)-105, Endeavour, as part of the Space 
Transportation System (STS)-126, experienced an in-flight fatigue failure of one of the three 
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) gaseous hydrogen (GH2) flow control valve (FCV) poppets.  
This type of failure has a remote potential consequence of the loss of the vehicle, so a root cause 
investigation was undertaken and the remaining FCV poppets were subjected to rigorous 
inspections.  Newly developed eddy current (EC) nondestructive evaluation (NDE) methods 
were successfully used to detect cracks, but probability of detection (POD) evaluations of the 
NDE methods had not been performed.  The lack of a POD evaluation results in an uncertainty 
of the sensitivity and accuracy of EC NDE methods being used to inspect flight FCV poppets. 
A POD evaluation was conducted for the EC system currently being used to inspect flight 
poppets using cracked poppet simulators.  The poppet simulator was designed to replicate the 
relevant physical features of the flight FCV poppets including: flight approved material and heat 
treatment schedule, poppet dimensions, and naturally occurring fatigue cracks that nucleated in 
the same location, shape, and size as those found in STS-126 and other flight FCV poppets.  The 
fatigue cracks were nucleated in the poppet simulators by using a specially designed fixture that 
mechanically loaded the critical poppet location.  Each cracked poppet simulator was examined 
using EC NDE and a scanning electron microscope (SEM) to identify the size and location of 
each crack greater than 0.001 inches (0.03 mm). 
A total of 55 cracked poppet simulators were created for the POD study.  These poppet 
simulators had a distribution of cracks with lengths from 0.001 to more than 0.1 inches (0.025 to 
more than 2.54 mm).  The measurements for the POD study were performed by two independent 
and certified inspectors with identical EC systems, and both inspectors conducted six 
examinations of each cracked poppet simulator.  In the absence of a specific allowable critical 
crack size from structural analysis, the flight poppet inspection from the EC system currently 
being used should continue to reject on any signals greater than the 0.2 volt threshold. 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
09-00506 
Version: 
1.1 
Title: 
STS-126 MPS#2 GH2 Flow Control Valve Broken Poppet 
Page #: 
10 of 59 
 
NESC Request No.: 09-00506 
5.0 Background 
OV-105 experienced an in-flight (STS-126) fatigue failure of one of the three SSME FCV 
poppets.  This type of failure has a remote potential consequence of the loss of the vehicle, so a 
root cause investigation was undertaken and the remaining FCV poppets were subjected to 
rigorous inspections.  Newly developed EC NDE methods were successfully used to detect 
cracks, but POD evaluations of the NDE methods had not been performed. This report describes 
a study that conducted a POD analysis to develop a quantifiable understanding of the size of 
FCV poppet cracks that can be found, and conversely missed, by an inspection. 
Each SSME has a FCV that adjusts the flow of GH2 to the External Tank (ET), which regulates 
the tank pressure during SSME operation.  The GH2 flow through the FCVs is restricted by a 
poppet valve that has two flow positions (high and low), and the FCVs from the three SSMEs are 
controlled independently to maintain the proper ET pressure as the liquid hydrogen (LH2) fuel is 
consumed.  The ET pressurization system is designed to successfully operate with only two of 
the three FCVs.  An ET vent valve will actuate to relieve the pressure when the ET internal 
pressure exceeds 35 pounds per squire inch (psi).  The failure of a FCV presents two concerns: 
 
1. The venting of GH2 presents an ignition risk for the early portion of the ascent. 
2. The liberation of a portion of the FCV could rupture downstream pressure lines, 
exasperating the venting problem and potentially causing an over pressurization in the 
Orbiter aft section. 
Flight controllers identified that GH2 was flowing from one FCV at a higher than commanded 
rate during the STS-126 mission in November 2008.  The flow rates in the other two FCVs were 
automatically reduced and no unusual ET pressurization issues were observed during ascent.  
The MPS was inspected after landing and the FCV poppet was observed to have a segment 
missing, as shown in Figure 5.0-1.  The damaged FCV was removed from OV-105, 
disassembled, and fractographic examination determined that the crack was caused by fatigue.  
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Figure 5.0-1. Cracked STS-126 GH2 FCV 
 
The subsequent STS-119 Flight Readiness Review determined that more information was needed 
on the FCV poppet cracking issue before proceeding to launch.  A root cause analysis was 
initiated and the FCVs from all three Orbiters and flight spares were subjected to a rigorous 
inspection.  The risk imposed to the Orbiter in the event of another poppet valve failure where a 
piece of the valve may be released into the GH2 flow was also investigated. 
The remaining flight and spare FCV poppets were examined using SEM inspection of the poppet 
fillet region, magnetic particle, and EC NDE.  All three methods were successful, and locating 
cracks with SEM was initially considered as providing the most accurate identification of crack 
size and location, with EC inspection as being the most promising for field applications.  
However, a POD study has not been conducted for any of the three techniques. 
5.1 Study Objective 
The objective of this study was to conduct a POD study to characterize the behavior of a newly 
developed EC NDE method used to find fatigue cracks in FCV poppets.   The study consists of 
two efforts: 
 
Task 1: Create and fully characterize a statistically significant number of fatigue cracks in 
FCV poppet simulators that replicate in size, shape, and location the defects 
observed in the flight poppets. 
Task 2: Conduct a POD analysis for the EC NDE method using the cracked poppet 
simulators developed in Task 1. 
 
The creation of cracked poppet simulators required the development of a specialized test 
procedure for initiating a distribution of small cracks (0.001 to greater than 0.10 inches, 0.025 to 
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more than 2.54 mm) in the fillet of the poppet simulators.  Each cracked poppet simulator was 
examined using a SEM to characterize the number, size, and location of all surface cracks.  The 
SEM findings were assumed to have identified all cracks greater than 0.001 inches (0.03 mm) in 
surface length and were the standards that were used to evaluate the EC NDE method.  A portion 
of the cracked poppet simulators were destructively examined to validate the surface SEM 
measurements and to characterize the crack shape, depth, and trajectory.  The remaining poppet 
simulators were examined by two independent and certified NDE inspectors, and analyses of the 
results were used to establish a POD for locating cracks in the flight hardware.  A catalog of all 
of the identified cracks was compiled to document the number of cracks, crack sizes, and crack 
locations for each poppet simulator. 
5.2 Material 
The GH2 FCVs were made of 440A stainless steel.  Flight-approved round bar stock of  
440A steel material with a diameter of 0.75 inch (19 mm) was obtained from the Kennedy Space 
Center in the fully annealed state.  The machined poppet simulators were heat-treated to attain a 
Rockwell C hardness (HRC) value of 54-58 to replicate the condition of the flight poppets.  The 
heat treatment schedule, with a tolerance on all temperatures of ± 10oF (5.6oC), used in this study 
is provided in Table 5.2-1. 
Table 5.2-1. Heat Treatment Schedule for the 440A Stainless Steel 
Step Activity 
1 Clean parts with methanol.  
2 Vacuum furnace: 
a. Pump down to 10-6 Torr. 
b. Heat at 2000oF (1093oC) per hour to 1900oF (1038oC), while at or below 
10-4 Torr. 
c. Hold part at temperature for 1 hour. 
d. Backfill with helium gas until part is below 225oF (107oC). 
e. Remove part. 
 
3 Within 30 minutes of removal from vacuum furnace, place parts in cold box 
at -120oF (-84oC).  Hold at temperature for 2 hours 
4 Remove parts from cold box and allow warming to ambient temperature. 
5 Place parts in air furnace at 350oF (177oC); hold at temperature for 2 hours. 
6 Remove parts from air furnace and allow cooling to ambient temperature 
7 Place parts in cold box at -120oF (-84oC); Hold at temperature for 2 hours 
8 Remove parts from cold box and allow warming to ambient temperature 
9 Place parts in air furnace at 350oF (177oC); hold at temperature for 1 hour 
10 Remove parts from air furnace and allow cooling to ambient temperature 
11 Place parts in cold box at -120oF (-84oC); Hold at temperature for 1 hour 
12 Remove parts from cold box and allow warming to ambient temperature 
13 Perform hardness test to verify 54-58 HRC 
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5.3 Poppet Simulator Test Procedure 
Fatigue tests were conducted on poppet simulators to produce a distribution of cracks for a POD 
study of EC inspection methods.  The poppet simulators were made of the same material and 
with the same critical dimensions of as the flight poppets to make inspection of the simulators as 
similar as possible to inspections of flight hardware.  The following sections describe the design 
of the poppet simulators and testing procedures. 
5.3.1 Poppet Simulator Design 
The poppet simulators were designed to have the same critical shaft, flange fillet radius, and 
flange thickness dimensions as the flight poppets.  The diameter of the flange was about  
0.12 inches (3 mm) larger than the flight poppet to provide sufficient surface area for the 
application of the cyclic test load.  The length of the poppet and the details away from the flange 
radius were not relative to the POD study and were eliminated in the simulator design, as shown 
in Figure 5.3-1a.  An extension rod was machined to facilitate the handling of the poppet 
simulators during inspection, as shown in Figure 5.3-1b.  The end of the poppet simulator away 
from the flange was threaded for the attachment of the extension rod.  The resulting poppet 
simulator was significantly shorter than the flight poppets, allowing the maximum number of 
poppet simulators to be machined from the limited supply of material.   
The flange fillet radius of each poppet simulator was polished after machining to enhance crack 
detection.  The poppet was rotated at about 90 revolutions per minute (rpm) and a diamond paste 
polishing grit was applied to the end of a sharpened wooden stick that was wrapped with a piece 
of cotton.  Five different levels of polishing grit were used (9, 6, 3, 1, and ¼ micron) for 3 
minutes each.  An optical inspection was performed to verify that no remnant machining marks 
or scratches were present on the poppet simulator flange fillet radius which could have 
influenced the NDE inspections. 
 
 
Figure 5.3-1. A Schematic of the Poppet Simulators and Extension Rods that were used in the NDE 
Study 
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5.3.2 Test Fixtures and Fatigue Loading Procedure 
The poppet simulator loading fixtures were designed to generate a tensile stress in a limited 
portion of the flange fillet radius, as shown in Figure 5.3-2.  The bottom fixture supported the 
edge of the poppet simulator flange at two locations that were 180 degrees apart.  The bottom of 
an aluminum ball rested on the hole in the center of the poppet simulator, and the top fixture 
applied a cyclic downward force to the top of the ball.  The force from the ball was reacted by 
the two regions of the poppet simulator flange that were in contact with the bottom fixture.  The 
highest tensile stress was in the flange fillet radius of the poppet simulator in the vicinity of the 
two loading regions.  This reduced the required inspection region to about ±15 degrees around 
the center of the two loading regions.  A reference line was placed on the bottom fixture and on 
each poppet simulator to ensure consistent alignment when the simulators were removed for 
inspection.  The subsequent inspection areas were referenced as the 0 or the 180 degree side.  
The reference line was removed after the SEM inspection and a new reference mark was etched 
into the edge of the flange at a random location relative to the 0 degree side to prevent the NDE 
inspectors from deducing the crack locations. 
 
 
Figure 5.3-2. Poppet Simulator and Loading Fixture 
 
The fixtures were mounted to a servo-hydraulic load frame, as shown in Figure 5.3-3, and cycled 
under constant load at a stress ratio (minimum stress/maximum stress) of R = 0.1 and frequencies 
of 35 to 65 Hz.  A series of preliminary tests were conducted to determine the optimal maximum 
compressive load for initiating cracks and values between 350 and 500 pounds were found to be 
successful.  Tests that were conducted above this level had small critical crack lengths and 
required few cycles to propagate a detectable crack to the critical crack size, making it nearly 
impossible to stop a test with a detectable crack.  Tests that were conducted below this range 
required millions of cycles to initiate cracks.  An empirical relationship between maximum 
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compressive load and the number of cycles required to initiate a fatigue crack is shown in  
Figure 5.3-4.   
 
Figure 5.3-3. Image of Poppet Simulator Loaded in a Test Fixture 
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Figure 5.3-4. The Number of Cycles required to Initiate Fatigue Cracks as a Function of the 
maximum Compressive Load 
 
Two methods were developed to stop the tests with sub-critical detectible cracks.  The first, or 
manual method, determined a target number of cycles from sacrificial tests that were fatigue 
cycled until failure.  Each poppet simulator was examined with an EC system prior to the fatigue 
cycling to establish a baseline response.  The simulators were then fatigue cycled for a fraction 
of the target number of cycles, and then the poppet simulators removed and re-examined with an 
EC system.  The poppet simulators were examined with an SEM to verify the presence of cracks 
only if a change in the baseline EC response was detected.  The simulator loading continued for a 
small number of additional cycles if no cracks were located using the SEM.  This technique 
successfully produced very small cracks (surface length ~0.001 inches (0.03 mm)), but also had 
many false calls and had cracks that grew to critical during the fatigue cycling between SEM/EC 
inspections. 
The second, or automated, method of generating cracks used the calculated compliance (slope of 
the load – displacement curve) from the fixture displacements.  The cyclic fatigue loading was 
stopped when a change in the compliance was observed.  A displacement gage was placed 
between the top and bottom fixture, as shown in Figure 5.3-5.  The compliance method acquired 
load and displacement data every 100 cycles, and then calculated the slope of the load versus 
fixture displacement data.  An increase in the slope would indicate the possibility of a crack 
growing in the poppet simulator, reducing the stiffness of the flanges.  The slope, or compliance, 
was plotted as a function of the number of applied cycles, as shown in Figure 5.3-6.  Initially the 
compliance decreased with loading cycles as the aluminum ball seated in the hole of the poppet 
simulator.  Eventually the influence of the aluminum ball seating was offset by the increasing 
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compliance of growing cracks and a rapid increase in overall compliance was observed.  The 
resulting crack length in the poppet simulator could be adjusted, somewhat successfully, by 
stopping the tests at different magnitudes of compliance change.  The poppet simulators were 
examined by SEM after each compliance cutoff and always had a crack with a surface length 
between 0.012 and 0.05 inches (0.3 to 1.3 mm). 
 
Figure 5.3-5. Test Fixture with Displacement Gage for Detecting Cracking using the Compliance 
Method 
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Figure 5.3-6.  Example of a Compliance Curve used to Detect Crack Growth in a Poppet Simulator 
Test 
5.3.3 Fatigue Crack Characterization Methods 
Crack inspection methods were used to detect the presence of cracks during the fatigue cycling 
and to characterize the size, shape, trajectory, location, and number of cracks in the poppet 
simulators.  NDE characterization methods were used to detect cracks and measure the surface 
length, allowing the cracked poppet simulators to be used for the POD study.  Destructive 
methods were used to characterize features like the crack shape, trajectory, and depth that were 
not visible from the poppet simulator surface. 
5.3.3.1 Laboratory EC Inspection 
The manual method of crack generation required periodic interruption and inspection of the 
poppet simulator during the fatigue testing.  A thorough SEM examination at each inspection 
interval was time and resource intensive, so a laboratory EC system was employed as a crack 
screening tool.  The EC system consisted of a custom designed probe that fit over the poppet 
simulator and a mechanized base that rotated the simulator, as shown in Figure 5.3-7.  The 
system rotated the poppet simulator twice in about two minutes and displayed the scan as a plot 
of voltage as a function of time.  A baseline scan of the poppet simulator was performed prior to 
fatigue cycling and compared with subsequent scans obtained after fatigue cycling.  The poppet 
simulator was returned to the loading fixture and cycling was continued if the scan did not show 
a significant change from the baseline.  Cracks result in an oscillation of the voltage response, 
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with an initial decrease as the probe first encounters the crack and an increase as the probe clears 
the crack, as shown in Figure 5.3-8.  The magnitude of the voltage deviation is proportional to 
the size of the crack.  The first signal of Figure 5.3-8 had a voltage deviation of about 1 volt and 
a 0.025 inch (0.64 mm) long crack was observed in the indicated location.  The second signal of 
Figure 5.3-8 had a voltage deviation of about 4 volts and a 0.078 inch (2 mm) long crack was 
observed 180 degrees from the first indication.  Fatigue cracks (~0.005 inches (0.13 mm)) 
exhibited a subtle voltage change that was barely larger than the background noise, so false calls 
were often observed when trying to generate small cracks.  The laboratory EC inspection results 
were not included in the POD study because the device was not a controlled, field inspection 
system. 
 
 
Figure 5.3-7. Image of the EC System used to Screen the Poppet Simulators for Cracks 
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Figure 5.3-8. EC Scan Result for a Poppet Simulator with Two Distinct Fatigue Cracks 
5.3.3.2 SEM Examination 
A SEM was used to characterize the surface length, location, and number of fatigue cracks in 
each poppet.  The poppets were polished, removing most of the manufacturing scratches, to aid 
in the location of the cracks.  The SEM examination only considered the regions of the poppet 
simulator flange radius that were ±15 degrees around the two primary loaded regions  
(0 and 180 degrees), as shown in Figure 5.3-9.  The fatigue cracks exhibited small crack mouth 
openings in the unloaded state, making detection using the SEM difficult at low magnifications 
(<100x).  Examination at higher magnification (>500x) was required to detect the fatigue cracks, 
which increased the inspection time by an order of magnitude.  A repliset mold of the surface 
was made while the poppet simulator was loaded to 50 to 80 percent of the peak cyclic load.  The 
repliset left a small amount of residual material at the crack mouth after the mold was removed 
and this residual material increased the crack detectability (due to surface charging), as shown in 
Figure 5.3-10.  A low magnification examination was used to identify the location, number, and 
approximate crack size, and the remnant repliset material was removed by a ¼ micron polish.  
The re-polished poppet simulators were examined with a high magnification SEM inspection of 
the known crack locations.  SEM inspections of failed poppet simulators that were polished to 
remove the residual repliset material did not find any evidence of repliset on the fracture 
surfaces. 
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Figure 5.3-9. Illustration of the High Stress Regions of the Poppet Simulators that were examined 
during the SEM Inspections 
 
 
Figure 5.3-10. SEM Images of a Crack in a Poppet Simulator with Repliset and after the Repliset has 
Been Removed  
 
Several of the cracked poppets were fractured to reveal the fracture surface to allow 
characterization of the crack depth and shape.  The initial attempts at destructive examination 
were performed by monotonically loading the cracked poppets to failure.  A change in loading 
condition from fatigue crack growth to ductile fracture would often result in a distinct change in 
the fracture surface morphology that allows the size and shape of the fatigue crack to be 
measured.  The change in fracture surface morphology for the material and loads used in this 
study was subtle and difficult to identify, so an alternative method of marking the end of the 
fatigue crack growth, or crack tip, was developed.  This method consisted of placing the poppet 
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simulators in an oven that was preheated to 600ºF and then increasing the temperature to 900ºF 
over 20 minutes.  The simulators were then removed and allowed to cool in air to oxidize the 
surface.  The oxidized poppet simulators were then fatigue cycled at a stress ratio of R = 0.8 and 
a peak load of 300 pounds until failure.  The combination of crack surface oxidation and the 
change in cyclic loading resulted in a distinct change in the fracture surface morphology, as 
shown in Figure 5.3-11. 
 
 
Figure 5.3-11. Example of the Fracture Surface Morphology that Resulted from the Marking Process 
5.4 Crack Characterization Results 
There were 73 poppet simulators manufactured and 62 were successfully tested and 
characterized in terms of number of cracks, surface crack sizes, crack location relative to the  
0 degree reference line, and crack location relative to other indications in the vicinity.  Each 
poppet simulator had at most two regions of fatigue crack growth (the 0 and 180 degrees) 
locations.  Some poppet simulators had crack growth in both regions (~68 percent) and the rest 
had crack growth in only one region (~32 percent).  A total of 97 distinct high stress regions with 
at least one fatigue crack were found in the 62 poppets.  Several of the poppet simulators failed 
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prematurely during testing and several others were destructively examined for crack depth and 
shape measurements.  Four poppet simulators that received no fatigue cycles and 51 poppet 
simulators with cracks were included in the POD analysis.  The following sections describe the 
results from the examinations of the poppet simulator tests. 
5.4.1 SEM Surface Analysis 
The flange radius of each poppet simulator was inspected with an SEM in a ±15 degree arc 
around the 0 and 180 degree high stress regions.  Each poppet simulator had a reference mark 
that was randomly selected so that the NDE inspectors would not deduce where the cracks were 
located.  For example, an NDE reference mark at 70 degrees would rotate the 0 and 180 degree 
crack locations to 290 and 119 degrees, respectively in the new reference system.  The NDE 
inspectors referenced the EC indications to the NDE reference mark. 
The SEM examination initially located all of the cracks in the loading region.  The example 
shown in Figure 5.4-1 contains two cracks that were located 110 degrees from the NDE 
reference mark (measured in a clockwise rotation).   Examination at higher magnification was 
performed for each located crack, recording the surface lengths and distances to other cracks, as 
shown in Figure 5.4-2.  An image record of every crack found in the tested poppet simulators is 
provided in Appendix A.  The distribution of largest crack in each loading region is shown in 
Figure 5.4-3, and the number of cracks found in each poppet is summarized in Table 5.4-1. 
The cracks that were located in the flight poppets were noted to have small crack openings, but 
no quantified measurements were provided.  Crack opening displacements may influence the 
detectability of fatigue cracks, so the crack opening displacements were measured in several of 
the poppet simulators to quantify this parameter for the POD analysis.  The crack opening 
displacement of the unloaded crack surfaces was characterized by examining several cracks at 
high magnification (~10,000x).  Several regions distributed along the crack length were 
documented at the high magnification and the separation of the two surfaces was measured at 
multiple locations, as illustrated in Figure 5.4-4.  The crack opening displacement measurements 
were made for cracks with surface length from 0.005 to 0.136 inches (0.13 to 3.5 mm).  As 
expected, the crack opening displacements were greatest in the center of the cracks and smallest 
at the crack tips.  Most of the crack opening displacements were less than 4 x 10-5 inch  
(1 micron) and all of the crack opening displacements at the crack tips were less than 8 x 10-6 
inch (0.2 micron), as shown in Figure 5.4-5. 
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Figure 5.4-1.  Example of an SEM Image that shows the Location of Two Cracks 
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Figure 5.4-2. Example of an SEM image that shows Sufficient Details to Measure the Lengths and 
Relative Positions of Two Cracks 
 
 
Figure 5.4-3.  Distribution of the Largest Crack per Loaded Region of the Poppet Simulators Tested 
 
#1
#2
Shaft
Radius
Number of
Cracks
Size of the Largest Crack
(inch)
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
09-00506 
Version: 
1.1 
Title: 
STS-126 MPS#2 GH2 Flow Control Valve Broken Poppet 
Page #: 
26 of 59 
 
NESC Request No.: 09-00506 
Table 5.4-1. Summary of the Number of Cracks Found in Each Poppet 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4-4. Image of a Poppet Crack at 10,000x Magnification with Crack Openings Measured at 
Several Locations 
Type Number IDs
Singe Crack 10 11,12,14, 17, 23, 24, 27, 40, 53, 55
2 cracks (180-degrees apart) 4 7, 18, 26, 51
Single location with <5 cracks 7 13, 20, 21, 22, 29, 54, 60
4< cracks <9 (0o or 180o) 3 19, 38, 42
4< cracks <9 (0o and 180o) 11 33, 34, 35, 39, 41, 47, 49, 57, 65, 66, 70
>8 cracks (0o or 180o) 1 37
>8 cracks (0o and 180o) 23
1, 31, 32, 36, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 50, 52, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 
63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72
No Cracks 3 16, 30, 73
TOTAL 62
Note: The numbers highlighted in red indicate poppets that have been broken open for surface examination
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Figure 5.4-5. Crack Opening Displacement for Several Poppets 
5.4.2 Destructive Examination Results 
The sensitivity of EC NDE methods may be related to the crack area, so several of the poppet 
simulators with fatigue cracks were destructively examined to determine the crack shape and 
depth.  The destructive examination also provided verification that the surface crack lengths 
measured in the SEM examination were accurate.  Five poppet simulators were destructively 
examined, revealing the shape of 16 cracks with surface lengths from 0.004 to over 0.13 inches 
(0.1 to 3.3 mm).  The crack fronts were roughly semi-elliptical shaped, so the POD analysis 
could estimate the crack depth or crack area from the observed relationship between surface 
crack length and aspect ratio (ratio of crack depth to half surface crack length). 
The process described in Section 5.3.3.2 was used to mark the crack front with both surface 
oxidation and fatigue cycling, and fracture with minimal plastic deformation of the surfaces.  The 
failed surfaces were examined to determine if the cracks revealed by the destructive process 
could be correlated to the results of the non-destructive surface examination.  The first check 
preformed was to determine if the location of the cracks in the fracture surface matched with that 
observed on the poppet simulator surface.  The presence of multiple cracks facilitated this check 
by allowing the measurement of the distance between the cracks.  Figure 5.4-6 shows an 
example where three cracks were found on the surface of the intact poppet, but only two were 
revealed in the destructive examination.  Cracks #4 and #6 appeared to be co-linear and about 
0.05 inches (1.3 mm) apart and crack #5 appeared to be offset at a different location on the 
radius.  The two cracks revealed in the destructive examination were 0.05 inches (1.3 mm) apart, 
suggesting that these cracks might be #4 and #6, whose coalescence during the high stress ratio 
fatigue cycling had bypassed crack #5.   Comparisons of the crack lengths from the surface 
observations and from the destructive examination were performed, as shown in Figures 5.4-7 
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and 5.4-8, and both methods provided identical crack lengths.  This provided additional evidence 
that the cracks found in the destructive examination were the same as cracks #4 and #6 from the 
observations from the intact surface.  Furthermore, the agreement of the surface crack lengths 
measured in the nondestructive and destructive examinations indicate that the nondestructive 
examinations were accurately locating the crack tips, thus reporting accurate surface crack length 
measurements.  The results from the destructive examination of the poppet simulators are 
provided in Appendix A of Volume II. 
The crack depth and surface crack length were measured for 16 individual cracks from 5 poppet 
simulators that were destructively examined, as summarized in Table 5.4-2. The aspect ratio of 
crack depth to half surface crack length was calculated as a function of the surface crack length, 
as shown in Figure 5.4-9.  Images of flight poppets from STS-126 revealed several crack fronts 
that indicated the crack size and shape at different points in time, as shown in Figure 5.4-10.  
Measurements of the surface crack length and crack depth were performed and the data was 
included in Figure 5.4-9.  The measurements indicated that the cracks in the poppet simulators 
had a very similar shape (aspect ratio) as the cracks observed in the flight poppet.  The 
measurements indicate that the smaller cracks were nearly semi-circular shaped, while the longer 
cracks became more elongated.  A power law relationship was fit to the relationship between 
crack depth and surface crack length, as shown in Figure 5.4-11 and Equation 1. 
 
 ܿݎܽܿ݇ ݀݁݌ݐ݄ ൌ 0.0823 ൈ ሺݏݑݎ݂ܽܿ݁ ܿݎܽܿ݇ ݈݁݊݃ݐ݄ሻ଴.଻଴ଶଵ (1) 
 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
09-00506 
Version: 
1.1 
Title: 
STS-126 MPS#2 GH2 Flow Control Valve Broken Poppet 
Page #: 
29 of 59 
 
NESC Request No.: 09-00506 
 
Figure 5.4-6. Images of a Fracture Surface from a Poppet Simulator and the Cracks observed on the 
Surface prior to Destructive Examination 
#4
#5
#60.050 inch
0.050 inch
#4
#6
(a) Surface SEM examination of the intact poppet simulator
(b) Fracture surface SEM examination of the broken poppet simulator
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
09-00506 
Version: 
1.1 
Title: 
STS-126 MPS#2 GH2 Flow Control Valve Broken Poppet 
Page #: 
30 of 59 
 
NESC Request No.: 09-00506 
 
Figure 5.4-7. Comparison of the Surface Crack Length Measured and after Destructive Examination 
of crack #4 from Figure 5.4-6  
0.006 inch
0.002 inch
0.006 inch
(a) Surface SEM examination of the intact poppet simulator
(b) Fracture surface SEM examination of the broken poppet simulator
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Figure 5.4-8. Comparison of the Surface Crack Length Measured and after Destructive Examination 
of Crack #6 from Figure 5.4-6 
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(a) Surface SEM examination of the intact poppet simulator
(b) Fracture surface SEM examination of the broken poppet simulator
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Table 5.4-2. Summary of the Crack Depth Measurements from the Poppet Simulators that were 
Destructively Examined 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4-9. Aspect Ratio of several Cracks from Poppet Simulators and Flight Poppets obtained from 
the Destructive Examinations 
Poppet # Crack #
SEM 
Surface 
Length, 
2c (inch)
Fracture 
Surface 
Length, 
2c (inch)
Fracture 
Surface 
Depth, a 
(inch)
Fracture 
Surface 
a/c
34 1 0.134 0.125 0.018 0.29
34 2a 0.013 0.013 0.004 0.62
34 2b 0.013 0.011 0.003 0.55
34 3 0.010 0.008 0.003 0.75
34 4 0.021 0.020 0.006 0.60
39 1 0.085 0.081 0.011 0.27
39 2 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.67
39 3 0.056 0.053 0.010 0.38
35 1 0.044 0.046 0.010 0.43
35 3 0.018 0.019 0.006 0.63
35 4 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.57
35 6 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.73
18 1 0.078 0.071 0.015 0.42
18 2 0.025 0.027 0.009 0.67
51 2 0.108 0.118 0.015 0.25
51 1 0.034 0.035 0.009 0.51
Aspect
Ratio
a/c
Surface Crack Length
(inch)
a
2c
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Figure 5.4-10. Image of the Crack Detected in Flight Poppet from STS-126 
 
Figure 5.4-11. Measured Crack Depth from the Destructive Examinations as a Function of the 
Surface Crack Length 
5.5 EC Simulated Poppet POD Testing and Analysis 
EC inspections were performed on 55 of the poppet simulators, described in the preceding 
sections, to acquire the data necessary for the POD analysis.  The inspections were performed by 
the two Boeing Company Huntington Beach inspectors responsible for the inspection of flight 
FCV poppets.  To ensure a “blind” inspection procedure, all poppet simulators were inspected 
Crack
Depth
(inch)
Surface Crack Length
(inch)
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with no information as to crack size or location.  In addition, four poppet simulators containing 
no cracks (control simulators) were randomly submitted for inspection.  The inspections were 
performed according to the established Boeing Company Eddy Current Procedure/Technique 
Sheet Flow Control Valve Poppet - #SSO-01 Revision C.  A copy of the procedure is included as 
Appendix B with only one modification; the inspectors were instructed not to use any specific 
threshold signal value to determine crack indications, but instead to identify all crack-like signal 
indications regardless of the signal magnitude.  This allowed the POD analysis to be performed 
independent of a threshold to estimate the smallest size cracks that could be detected with  
90/95 POD.  Both inspectors repeated the inspection on each poppet simulator six times to 
provide data on operator repeatability.   
A poppet rotation device and a probe holder with controlled degrees of freedom were needed to 
establish a repeatable EC data acquisition process.  A UniWest US 1779 bolt rotation device 
(Figures 5.5-1 and 5.5-2) and probe holder was the selected for this purpose.  This configuration 
used a model US 1779 bolt rotation device/scanner and a model US 1839 probe (Figure 5.5-3).  
The probe tip has an included angle of 60 degree and a radius of 0.03125 inch (0.8 mm).  The 
design allows the probe to contact the root of a bolt thread for detection of cracks at the thread 
root.  The probe has two coils in a driver pick-up arrangement and their centers are separated by 
approximately 0.1 inch (2.54 mm).  This configuration was used to inspect flight poppets and the 
popper simulators in the POD study. 
 
 
Figure 5.5-1.  US 1779 (UniWest) Bolt Inspection Scanner 
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Figure 5.5-2.  US 454 (UniWest) EC Crack Detector 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5-3.  EC Bolt Thread Root Inspection Probe US 1839 
 
The 440A poppet material is a ferromagnetic martensite steel with an electrical resistivity of  
0.5 percent International Annealed Copper Standard (IACS), a maximum relative permeability of 
60, and a coercive force of approximately 65 Oersted.  The relative magnetic permeability was 
about 25 at a demagnetized (or a very low magnetized) state.  The magnetic properties were 
verified at the NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) NDE Laboratory.  The magnetic 
properties indicate that the material was mildly ferromagnetic and held residual magnetism  
(~1 Gauss) after an ambient demagnetization.  A variation in microstructure may cause some 
variation in magnetic permeability and the residual stress and cold work (strain) could also cause 
the magnetic permeability to change in some ferromagnetic steels.  The poppet operational 
environment constitutes surface flow of GH2 at a certain pressure, temperature and rate; and 
exposure to various vibration modes and acoustic waves generated due to gas flow as well as 
from external sources.  Flight poppets are also subjected to a magnetic force from the FCV 
solenoid.  It is suspected that the poppet operational environment may cause changes in the 
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magnetic permeability that could affect the EC response.  Thus, the EC technique needs to be 
sensitive to detect cracks in the presence of any potential permeability range and variability at 
the inspection site. 
A frequency of 2 MHz was selected to optimize the detection of shallow cracks (0.005 inches 
(0.13 mm)).  An electro-discharged machined (EDM) notch standard was fabricated from flight 
S/N 33-361 poppet (Figure 5.5-4).  Note that any change in the magnetic permeability at notches 
due to the EDM process was not characterized.  The notch dimensions were 0.030 long x  
0.015 deep x 0.005 inch wide (0.76 x 0.38 x 0.13 mm).  Three circumferential notches of the 
same size were machined in poppet S/N 33-361; the first notch was located at the center of the 
radius, the second was located at the radius tangential point with the shank, and the third notch 
was located at the radius tangential point with the flange. 
 
Figure 5.5-4.  S/N 33 Poppet Standard 
 
The voltage scan and phase diagrams were obtained from the EC responses for the three EDM 
notches of poppet S/N 33-361, as shown in Figures 5.5-5 and 5.5-6, respectively.  The peak-to-
peak voltage (Vpp) was the difference (0.36 Vpp) between the two horizontal lines that bracket 
the I1 indication in Figure 5.5-5.  Scanning of the EC probe causes a slight back and forth 
movement that causes lift-off of the probe coil relative to the contact surface.  The EC response 
changes along a particular direction in the phase diagram due to this lift off, as indicated by the 
double arrow in phase diagram of Figure 5.5-6.  Crack indications will appear as a sharp increase 
in the voltage scan and will have tight phase loops that point towards 1 to 2 o’clock on the phase 
diagram.  Poppet S/N 33-361 also has a smaller crack-like indication to the right of the I3 peak 
and a non-crack-like indication between the I2 and I3 peaks in the voltage scan of Figure 5.5-5.  
However, the magnitude of these additional signals is small in relation to the typical background 
noise level and they have not been associated with additional detected cracks or defects. 
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Figure 5.5-5.  EC Voltage Scan of S/N 33-361 Standard 
  
 
Figure 5.5-6. EC Phase Diagram of S/N 33-361 Standard 
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A non-magnetic (titanium) bolt standard (1 percent IACS) was used for verification of the 
technique sensitivity.  The response from the titanium standard was slightly different from the 
A440 steel, but comparable in phase and amplitude to the response from the S/N 33-361 standard 
and the cracks in 440A poppet simulators.  The EC setup was verified before and after the EC 
test on the titanium standard.  The EC inspections were performed after demagnetizing the 
poppet or verifying that the magnetic field was less than 1 Gauss to minimize the effect of the 
residual magnetic field on the EC response.  
The results from the multiple EC inspections on the simulated poppet by both inspectors, listed 
in Appendix A, were used as input for the POD analysis for the EC inspection process for 
poppets.  Additionally, a statistical analysis of the variation in signal responses for multiple 
inspections and across the different inspectors was performed to understand measurement 
variability.  These results were used to establish additional criteria for crack indications based on 
changes in signal response before and after poppet usage (e.g., flow balancing, flight operations).  
The first POD model was an analysis of the crack “calls” and “no calls” made after the EC 
poppet simulator inspections.  Additional analyses were performed based on the specific signals 
(Vpp) obtained by the inspectors for each poppet simulator.  The POD curves were derived from 
regression models that used different explanatory variables (e.g., largest crack size, cumulative 
crack length, total crack area). 
A total of 55 poppet simulators (including 4 “control” uncracked poppet simulators) were 
examined by the two inspectors.  The cracked poppet simulators had either one region with 
cracks or two diametrically opposed regions with cracks.  The number of cracks in an individual 
region varied from 1 to more than 20.  Note the two inspectors were not given any information 
relative to the number of cracks contained in the simulators or crack location.  The initial 
characterization of the cracked poppet simulators was in terms of the number of cracks and the 
largest crack contained on the diametrically opposed loading regions of the poppet simulators.  
The diametrically opposed loading allowed the analyses to consider two inspection results from 
each poppet.  A summary of the SEM crack findings and the EC inspection results from 
Inspector 1 and 2 are provided in Table 5.5-1.  The largest crack found in each loading region, 
and the total number of cracks identified, are reported along with the measured Vpp voltages and 
a crack indication (“Y”, “N”, or “Poss.”) for each inspector.  Inspector 1 identified several crack 
indications as “possible crack start”, hence the “Poss.” designation in Table 5.5-1.  The 
highlighted cells in Table 5.5-1 indicated false calls and missed cracks.  
The distribution of the number of cracked regions reported by the inspectors and the number of 
crack regions reported by the SEM examination are provided in Table 5.5-2.  For example, the 
SEM examination determined that 32 poppet simulators had cracks in both loading regions, 
while Inspector 2 reported: no cracks on two; located cracks in only a single loading region on 
18; and located cracks in both loading regions on 12 of these 32 poppet simulators.  Note that an 
inspector reporting a Vpp signal response did not necessarily indicate that it was an indication of 
a crack.  The data from Inspector 1 contained several cases of responses designated as “possible 
crack start”, indicating that the signal was stronger than the background noise, but did not meet 
the 3:1 signal to noise ratio criterion needed to be identified as a crack. 
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Table 5.5-1.  Summary of SEM Characterization and Inspection Findings  
 
 
Average 
Vpp
Crack 
Call
Average 
Vpp
Crack 
Call
Average 
Vpp
Crack 
Call
Average 
Vpp
Crack 
Call
1 0.018 5 0.157 Y 0.148 Y 0.007 4 - N - N
4 - 0 0.024 N 0.031 N - 0 - N - N
7 0.027 2 0.248 Y 0.236 Y 0.024 1 0.137 Y 0.197 Y
11 0.075 1 1.127 Y 1.076 Y - 0 - N - N
12 0.041 1 0.588 Y 0.661 Y - 0 - N - N
13 0.014 1 0.198 Y 0.189 Y - 0 - N - N
14 0.033 1 0.420 Y 0.438 Y - 0 0.039 Poss. - N
16 - 0 0.153 Y 0.124 Y - 0
17 0.026 1 0.275 Y 0.263 Y - 0 - N - N
18 0.078 1 1.063 Y 1.055 Y 0.025 1 0.248 Y 0.259 Y
19 0.037 5 0.512 Y 0.509 Y - 0 - N - N
20 0.017 3 0.151 Y 0.148 Y - 0 - N - N
21 0.017 5 0.142 Y 0.135 Y - 0 - N - N
22 0.022 3 0.227 Y 0.225 Y - 0 - N - N
23 0.026 1 0.195 Y 0.183 Y - 0 - N - N
24 0.012 1 0.087 Y 0.091 Y - 0 - N - N
26 0.034 1 0.357 Y 0.359 Y 0.005 1 - N - N
27 0.032 1 0.444 Y 0.462 Y - 0 - N - N
29 0.038 4 0.540 Y 0.562 Y - 0 - N - N
30 - 0 0.051 N 0.062 N - 0 - N - N
31 0.015 10 0.231 Y 0.226 Y 0.002 1 - N - N
32 0.025 6 0.247 Y 0.245 Y 0.012 3 0.080 Y 0.071 Y
33 0.026 4 0.222 Y 0.214 Y 0.003 1 - N - N
34 0.134 1 0.684 Y 0.670 Y 0.036 3 0.233 Y 0.217 Y
35 0.044 3 0.590 Y 0.575 Y 0.006 2 0.070 Poss. - N
36 0.014 17 0.160 Y 0.158 Y 0.009 3 0.092 Y 0.076 Y
37 0.022 3 0.249 Y 0.259 Y 0.002 3 0.055 Poss. - N
38 0.078 1 0.900 Y 0.895 Y 0.014 2 0.077 Y 0.081 Y
39 0.084 2 1.005 Y 0.968 Y 0.059 2 0.667 Y 0.641 Y
40 0.010 1 0.080 Y - No Data - 0 - N - No Data
41 0.055 4 0.802 Y 0.821 Y 0.002 1 - N - N
42 0.025 5 0.243 Y 0.265 Y - 0 0.043 Poss. - N
43 0.012 21 0.147 Y 0.148 Y 0.003 6 0.044 Poss. - N
44 0.038 7 0.270 Y 0.275 Y 0.009 2 0.043 Poss. - N
45 0.014 1 0.080 Y 0.065 Y 0.009 4 0.079 Y 0.088 Y
46 0.012 10 0.098 Y 0.101 Y 0.006 9 0.069 Poss. - N
47 0.014 6 0.141 Y 0.144 Y 0.004 1 0.059 Poss. - N
48 0.041 11 0.353 Y 0.344 Y 0.004 2 - N - N
49 0.045 5 0.807 Y 0.822 Y 0.002 1 - N - N
50 0.022 5 0.212 Y 0.209 Y 0.005 4 0.057 Poss. - N
51 0.108 1 1.045 Y 1.064 Y 0.032 1 0.419 Y 0.419 Y
52 0.033 8 0.221 Y 0.218 Y 0.015 7 0.099 Y 0.095 Y
53 0.136 1 1.115 Y 1.106 Y - 0 - N - N
54 0.017 2 0.212 Y 0.219 Y - 0 - N - N
55 0.004 1 0.041 N 0.035 N - 0 - N - N
57 0.087 5 0.485 Y 0.484 Y 0.006 3 0.168 Y 0.163 N
60 0.037 6 0.610 Y 0.611 Y - 0 - N - N
61 0.018 13 0.193 Y 0.203 Y 0.016 15 0.176 Y 0.177 Y
64 0.025 14 0.240 Y 0.242 Y 0.004 6 0.069 Poss. - N
65 0.004 3 0.077 N 0.081 N 0.002 3 - N - N
66 0.025 4 0.187 Y 0.191 Y 0.005 1 - N - N
67 0.009 7 0.091 Poss. 0.097 N 0.007 8 - N - N
68 0.025 8 0.210 Y 0.220 Y 0.012 6 0.124 Y 0.121 Y
70 0.016 3 0.179 Y 0.185 Y 0.008 2 0.099 Poss. 0.099 N
73 - 0 0.068 N 0.096 N - 0 - N - N
Largest 
Crack 
(inch)Poppet
Loading Region with the Largest Crack Diametrical Opposite Loading Region
Total 
Cracks
Largest 
Crack 
(inch)
Inspector 1 Inspector 2 Inspector 1 Inspector 2
Total 
Cracks
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Table 5.5-2. Number of Loaded Regions with Known Cracks and the Reported Responses 
 
5.5.1 Hit/Miss Analysis 
The first POD analysis was performed on the individual calls made by the inspectors versus the 
largest crack length in a cracked region.  The data were analyzed as if the two loaded regions of a 
poppet simulator were independent inspections.  Thus, from the SEM characterizations there 
were a total of 83 data points (19 + 2x32) from cracked regions.  The loaded regions that were 
found to have cracks by the SEM characterization, but did not have a crack response indicated by 
the inspectors were considered as a “no call.” 
Table 5.5-3 contains a summary of the calls made by each inspector.  The number of times 
Inspector 1 made a “possible crack start” call was denoted as “Poss.”  Both inspectors reported 
crack indications for all loading regions where the largest crack was 0.010 inches (0.25 mm) or 
greater.  The inspectors only reported a few “possible” crack indications and no “hits” 
(unambiguous crack indications) in the loaded regions where the largest crack was 0.005 inches 
(0.13 mm) or smaller.  The loaded regions with the largest crack in the range of 0.006 to 0.009 
inches (0.15 to 0.23 mm) were where the mixed (crack/no crack) results occurred and where the 
rise in the estimated POD curve was expected to occur. 
 
Table 5.5-3.  Inspection Findings Based on the Largest Crack Length in a Loading Region 
 
 
The “Poss.” calls from Inspector 1 were considered as no calls in the fitting of the POD curves to 
the hit/miss data, because the indications violate the 3:1 signal to noise criteria, and violating that 
criteria would likely result in an increase in the number of false calls.  Figure 5.5-7 shows the 
estimated curves from the model ܱܲܦሺܽሻ ൌ Φሺܿ ൅ ݀ · ln ሺܽሻሻ, where Φ is the standard 
Gaussian cumulative distribution function, a is the crack size, and c and d are fit parameters.  As 
expected, the mixed region of hits and misses was in the range where the largest crack was 
between 0.006 and 0.009 inches (0.15 to 0.23 mm).  Table 5.5-3 indicates that Inspector 1 had  
3 hits and 7 misses, whereas Inspector 2 had 2 hits and 8 misses.  Intuition might suggest that 
Inspector 1 would have a “better” estimated POD curve.  The three hits of Inspector 1 were for 
loaded regions where the largest cracks were 0.006 and 0.009 inches (0.15 to 0.23 mm), whereas 
Inspector 1 Inspector2 Inspector 1 Inspector2 Inspector 1 Inspector2
0 1 1 1 2 3 3
1 16 17 10 19 1 1
2 2 0 21 11 0 0
No Data 0 1 0 0 0 0
Total 19 19 32 32 4 4
SEM: Cracks on one side SEM: Cracks on two sidesSides 
Reported
Dummy Simulators
False No Poss. No Poss. No Poss. Crack Crack No Data
1 1 24 2 12 3 2 5 3 58 0 110
2 1 26 0 15 0 8 0 2 57 1 110
> 0.009
Total 
Loading 
Regions
No Crack 0.001 to 0.005
Largest Crack Length in a Loading Region (inch)
Inspector
0.006 to 0.009
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of the two hits from Inspector 2 were for loaded regions where the largest crack was 0.009 inches 
(0.23 mm).  There were a total of 4 loaded regions where the largest crack was 0.009 inches 
(0.23 mm) and therefore a maximum likelihood fit to Inspector 2 data is a steep curve going 
through probability of 0.5 at 0.009 inches (12.7 to 0.23 mm).  That is, the likelihood is 
maximized as long as the curve is essentially 0 at 0.008 inches (0.20 mm), 1 at 0.010 inches 
(0.25 mm), and 0.5 at 0.009 inches (0.23 mm).  However, the overlap of crack lengths for the  
2 hits of Inspector 1 induces more variation in the estimate, translating to a higher estimate for 
the crack lengths corresponding to the higher probabilities.  The net result was that for the 
purposes of making a confidence statement for the crack length corresponding to a POD of 0.9, it 
was more conservative to use the inspection results of Inspector 1.  The confidence bounds 
shown in Figure 5.5-7 were based on likelihood ratio statistics and the maximum likelihood fit 
that yielded a POD function estimate of ܱܲܦሺܽሻ ൌ Φሺ21.6903 ൅ 4.51314 כ ln ሺܽሻሻ.  Here, 
Φሺ·ሻ was the standard Gaussian distribution function and a was the crack length in inches. 
 
 
Figure 5.5-7.  Estimated POD Curves from Hit/Miss Data.  95 Percent Confidence on Crack Size 
yielding a POD of 0.90 is shown for Inspector 1 
 
A study with multiple cracks at inspection sites [ref. 1] reported that the analysis of hit/miss data 
using the largest crack size as the explanatory variable resulted in optimistic POD curves when 
applied to inspections of single cracks.  Thus, the POD curve of Figure 5.5-7 applies to the 
detection of a cracked poppet simulator, characterized by the longest crack present, rather than 
the detection of a specific crack.  
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5.5.2 Signal Analysis 
The initial analysis of the response signal data was to ascertain if the data exhibited an influence 
due to the individual inspector.  The Vpp responses reported from individual poppet simulators 
by the two inspectors were compared, as shown in Figure 5.5-8, and nearly all of the 
measurements fall on a line with a slope of 1.  The only exception was on poppet simulator #40, 
where the recorded Vpp value from Inspector 1 was an order of magnitude lower than that from 
Inspector 2.  A re-examination of the recorded signals indicated that a clerical error had occurred 
and Inspector 2 had examined poppet simulator ID41 twice and had skipped poppet simulator 
ID40.  Thus, only the one correct value for ID40 was carried through the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5.5-8.  The Vpp Response of Inspector 2 versus Inspector 1   
 
The inspectors recorded 6 inspections for each poppet simulator and the measurements from both 
inspectors were combined since no indication of systematic differences between inspectors was 
found.  The standard deviation of the six Vpp measurements versus the average Vpp for each 
inspection indicates that the standard deviation increased as the mean response increased, as 
shown in Figure 5.5-9.  This implies that uncertainty associated with the individual responses 
increased as the magnitude of the response increased.  The ultimate goal was to perform a 
regression analysis for response as a function of crack size and to estimate the POD from the 
distributions derived from that analysis.  Therefore, a transform of the response was considered 
to stabilize the uncertainty across the range of crack sizes.  The log response was regressed 
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against the log crack size in an “a-hat” versus “a” analysis.  However, the log response 
transformation overly compensates for a standard deviation that increases with increasing crack 
size and undercompensates for a standard deviation that decreases with increasing crack size.  
The family of power transforms (that includes the log transform as a special case) was chosen as 
candidates to stabilize the uncertainty across the crack size range. 
 
 
Figure 5.5-9.  Standard Deviation versus Mean of the Vpp Responses (combined for both inspectors) 
for Individual Poppet Simulator Inspections 
 
A power of 0.6 (ݔ଴.଺) was found to provide the best stabilization of the variances for the entire 
crack size range, as shown in Figure 5.5-10.  Note that, aside from a few extreme values, the 
tendency for standard deviation to increase with increasing crack sizes has been diminished.  
Three of the five points with largest standard deviations in Figure 5.5-10 were from inspections 
of the uncracked (control) poppet simulators.  The remaining two points were from poppet 
simulators where the averages from the individual inspectors had the greatest difference.  In 
other words, the higher standard deviations result from a combination of repeatability within 
inspector, and an inspector-to-inspector increase in variation. 
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Figure 5.5-10.  Standard Deviation versus Mean of the Vpp Responses Transformed by a Power of 0.6 
(combined for both inspectors) for Individual Poppet Simulator Inspections 
5.5.2.1 Longest Surface Crack Length as Explanatory Variable 
The ݔ଴.଺ transform on the Vpp responses were averaged and plotting against the longest crack 
length, as shown in Figure 5.5-11.  The results were divided into 3 categories: no additional 
cracks; 1 or 2 additional cracks; and more than 3 additional cracks, according to how many 
cracks were located by the SEM examination of each loaded region.  The number of cracks in a 
loading region did not appear to have a strong influence on the response level.   Additional 
regression of the transformed response against both the “longest surface crack length” and “the 
number of additional cracks” confirmed this observation with statically significant (p<0.001) 
dependency on crack size and a statistically insignificant (p ~ 0.7) dependency on the number of 
additional cracks.  
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Figure 5.5-11.  Transformed Response versus Largest Crack Length for Individual Poppet Simulator 
Inspections 
 
A nearly linear relationship between the transformed response mean and the largest crack size 
appears to exist for crack lengths to approximately 0.06 to 0.08 inches (1.5 to 2.0 mm), as shown 
in Figure 5.5-11.  The responses from the largest three cracks and a crack with a length of about 
0.08 inches (2.0 mm) that had an atypically low transformed response were not included in the 
subsequent analysis to fit the linear region.  
The poppet simulators had 19 loaded regions that were uncracked and four control poppet 
simulators.  Both inspectors recorded Vpp measurements for all of the control poppet simulators 
and Inspector 1 recorded the response for one other loaded side where no cracks were located by 
the SEM examination.  The responses in the uncracked loaded regions were modeled as censored 
observations, even though the inspectors did not record a response.  Thus, the exact response 
value was unknown, but within a value in the interval of [0, C], where C had to be determined.   
Examination of the inspection results revealed that the crack “hits” were not made solely on the 
magnitude of the Vpp response because some “hits” were reported with responses that were 
smaller than the responses of reported “misses”.  The largest recorded transformed response that 
resulted in a “miss” call was 0.2490 (0.099 in the original scale) and the smallest recorded 
response that resulted in a “hit” call was 0.2115 (0.075 in the original scale).  An approximate 
midpoint of this region of 0.225 (0.083 in original scale) was selected for the censoring level that 
was applied to the loaded regions where no cracks were found by the SEM evaluation and no 
0.140.120.100.080.060.040.020.00
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
largest flaw (inch)
T
ra
ns
fo
rm
ed
 r
es
po
ns
e 
m
ea
n 
(V
pp
 *
*.
6)
none
1 or 2
3 or greater
additional flaws
Transformed mean versus largest flaw size
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
09-00506 
Version: 
1.1 
Title: 
STS-126 MPS#2 GH2 Flow Control Valve Broken Poppet 
Page #: 
46 of 59 
 
NESC Request No.: 09-00506 
inspection responses were recorded.  The maximum likelihood estimates from this analysis 
yielded ̂ߤ ൌ 0.1304, ߪො ൌ 0.0656.  These values are not significantly different from the intercept 
and standard deviation estimated from the regression fit to the data that includes only the loaded 
regions with cracks.  Thus, the crack data were combined with the no crack data and the resulting 
106 data values (75 recorded plus 31 censored, but excluded the 4 long cracks noted earlier) 
were analyzed in a regression model. 
A linear fit to this data yielded a mean regression line of: 
 
  ௣ܸ௣.଺ ൌ 0.1353 ൅ 12.1489 כ ݈݋݊݃݁ݏݐ ݏݑݎ݂ܽܿ݁ ܿݎܽܿ݇ ݈݁݊݃ݐ݄. 
 
The variation of points around the mean characterized by a standard deviation estimate of 
ߪො ൌ 0.0711.  This linear fit, overlaid with the observed and censored responses, is shown  
Figure 5.5-12. 
 
 
 Figure 5.5-12.  Linear Fit in the Transform Scale with Censored Data Shown  
 
The POD curves derived from the fit parameters and different crack/no crack threshold values 
(T) are shown in Figure 5.5-13.  Except for the threshold of 0.2 volt, the thresholds were the 
levels estimated to yield the corresponding false call rates.  The 95 percent confidence interval 
for the crack length that has a 0.90 POD was determined using the likelihood ratio method and 
are shown by the arrows in Figure 5.5-13. 
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The threshold level of 0.20 (probability) was included in Figure 5.5-13 because that level had 
been previously proposed for the screening of flight poppets.  The estimated false call rate 
associated with the 0.20 threshold level was small (< 0.03 percent) based on the analysis that 
used the longest crack length as the explanatory variable. 
 
 
Figure 5.5-13.  Estimated POD Curves from Signal Strength (Vpp) versus size of Longest Crack.  The 
95 percent confidence on Crack Length Yielding a POD of 0.90 is shown for Threshold Level.   
5.5.2.2 Cumulative Surface Crack Length as Explanatory Variable 
The analysis presented in the previous section (signal regressed against the largest crack length) 
indicated a lack of dependence of the number of cracks present in the loaded regions on the Vpp 
response.  However, an analysis that examined the cumulative damage of multiple cracks was 
evaluated because the structural integrity of an individual poppet and the probability of the 
poppet surviving a single flight may be influenced by the totality of damage.  Thus, the 
regression analysis of the previous section was repeated using the cumulative lengths of all 
cracks in a loaded region as the explanatory variable.  The linear fit to the transformed Vpp and 
cumulative crack length data resulted in the mean of regression line of: 
 
 ௣ܸ௣.଺ ൌ 0.0993 ൅ 6.7149 כ ܿݑ݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ݏݑݎ݂ܽܿ݁ ܿݎܽܿ݇ ݈݁݊݃ݐ݄. 
 
The variation of points around the mean was characterized by a standard deviation estimate of 
ߪො ൌ 0.1810, as shown in Figure 5.5-14.  The results shown in Figure 5.5-14 indicated that the 
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variation about the mean line likely increased as the total crack lengths increased.  However, as 
indicated with the response versus the longest crack length, it may be the case that the signal 
response would eventually flatten out.  The data with respect to the cumulative crack length 
variable are not sufficient to estimate if and where this might occur. 
 
 
Figure 5.5-14.  Transformed Response versus Cumulative Crack Lengths 
 
The POD curves were estimated for different threshold levels, as shown in Figure 5.5-15.  The 
large variation around the mean line calculated using the cumulative crack length as the 
explanatory variable, resulted in the estimated false call rate for the proposed threshold level of 
0.20 volts to be approximately 6 percent.   
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Figure 5.5-15.  Estimated POD curves from signal strength (Vpp) versus sum of all crack lengths in 
loaded region.  The 95 percent confidence on crack length yielding a POD of 0.90 is shown for 
threshold level. 
 
A comparison of the results calculated using the maximum crack length and the cumulative crack 
size as the explanatory variables indicated that the cumulative crack length was less effective in 
explaining the signal variations than was the maximum crack length.  The finite dimensions of 
the probe and the nature of how the probe was swept in the radius suggested that the signal did 
not react equally to all the cracks in terms of surface length. 
5.5.2.3 Cumulative Crack Area in Restricted Geography as Explanatory Variable 
The accumulation of the cross sectional area of the cracks within a finite diameter circle was 
considered as an explanatory variable to evaluate the influence of multiple cracks on the Vpp 
response.  The cross sectional area for each crack was estimated by assuming an elliptical shape 
and estimating the crack depth from the power law function of surface crack length previously 
given in Equation 1 and Figure 5.4-11.  The largest accumulated crack area for a 0.040 inch  
(1.0 mm) diameter circle within the region-of-cracking was considered as the explanatory 
variable for signal strength, as shown in Figure 5.5-16. 
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Figure 5.5-16.  Illustration of the Use of a 0.040 inch (1.0 mm) Circle for Accumulating Crack Area 
 
The accumulated area based on the observed surface crack lengths and the aspect ratio model 
described above was used as the explanatory variable and signal strength, as shown in Figure 
5.5-17.  The data had 12 instances where the surface crack length was more than 0.04 inches  
(1.0 mm) in length and for those 12 instances, the maximum crack length alone was used to 
determine the accumulated crack area.  The data from Figure 5.5-17 were modified to use the 
area associated with a 0.04 inch (1.0 mm) crack for the 12 instances where the surface crack 
length exceeded this dimension, as shown in Figure 5.5-18.  The linear fit to the transformed 
Vpp and accumulated area data resulted in the mean of regression line of: 
 
 ௣ܸ௣.଺ ൌ 0.1170 ൅ 2512.7 כ ܿݑ݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܿݎܽܿ݇ ܽݎ݁ܽ. 
 
The 10th percentile value was estimated based on the standard deviation estimate of ߪො ൌ 0.0917.  
The intersection of a threshold value for making a call with the 10th percentile line was at the ܽଽ଴ 
crack size.  The horizontal line shown in Figure 5.5-18 corresponds to a threshold for ௣ܸ௣ of  
0.2 ( ௣ܸ௣.଺ ൌ 0.3807). 
 
The POD curves were estimated using the above model and different threshold values, as shown 
in Figure 5.5-19.  The false call rate was estimated for each of the threshold values.  The value 
Aggregated Crack Area = (1/4)*m *  (l2n+1 + l3n+1 + l4n+1 + l5n+1 + l6n+1 + l7n+1 + l8n+1 + l9n+1 )
#3-4
#1
#2
#7
#12
#10-11 #13
#5-6
#8-9
#14
Cracks 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 
are within the 0.04” circle
Aggregated Crack Length = l2 + l3 + l4 + l5 + l6 + l7 + l8 + l9
m = 0.0823          n = 0.7021 (see previous figure)
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associated with the nominal threshold of 0.20 volts was 0.2 percent, a value between the  
0.03 percent for the largest crack length and the 6 percent for the cumulative crack length 
models.   
 
 
Figure 5.5-17.  Transformed signal versus maximum cumulative area within 0.04 inch (1.0 mm) circle.  
Regions containing single cracks larger than 0.040 inch (1.0 mm) are shown with cross sectional area 
from the largest single crack. 
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Figure 5.5-18. Transformed signal versus maximum cumulative area within 0.04 inch (1.0 mm) circle.  
Regions containing single cracks larger than 0.040 inch (1.0 mm) are shown with cross sectional area 
from the largest single crack. 
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Figure 5.5-19.  Estimated POD curves from signal strength (Vpp) versus Cumulative Cross-Sectional 
area of Flaws within 0.04 inch (1.0 mm) Circle  
6.0 Discussion of Summary Results 
Poppet simulators were generated to reproduce the relevant material and geometric 
characteristics of the flight FCV poppet valves.  Loading was applied to the flange of these 
simulators in two locations 180 degrees apart, resulting in a cyclic tensile stress in the area where 
cracks were observed in the flight FCV poppets.  Although the actual loading was expected to 
result in fatigue cracks randomly distributed around the circumference of the flange, the 
simulators were loaded in a way to limit the area that would require detailed inspection by 
producing small fatigue cracks in known regions.  A total of 72 poppet simulators were made for 
study, containing a total of 97 cracked regions.  The largest individual crack for each cracked 
region was identified and found to range in size from 0.002 to 0.136 inches (0.05 to 3.5 mm).  Of 
those cracks, 35 percent were 0.01 inches (0.25 mm) or less, 50 percent between 0.011 and  
0.040 inches (0.28 to 1.0 mm), and the remaining 15 percent above 0.04 inches (1.0 mm).   
Five of the poppet simulators were destructively examined, revealing the fracture surface of  
16 cracks.  The surface crack lengths obtained from the fracture surfaces correlated with those 
obtained from the SEM examination, indicating that this inspection method accurately identified 
the crack lengths to within 0.001 inches (0.03 mm).  The destructive examination of the cracks 
also provided a measurement of the crack depth and shape that allowed the crack area to be 
estimated from the crack surface length in the intact poppet simulators.  A catalog of the number 
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of cracks, the surface crack lengths, the circumferential location of the cracks, and the results of 
the NDE inspections was developed, as shown in Appendix A. 
Three regression models were used to derive POD curves, each having different explanatory 
variables to evaluate the influence of multiple cracks.  The extent that any or all regression 
analyses reflect the actual probabilities associated with the EC inspection of flight poppets 
depends upon the fidelity of the simulated cracked poppets in representing the cracks that occur 
in service.  Although the three regression models evaluated multiple cracks in a different manner, 
each can be thought of as being applied to a single surface crack measurement.  However, this 
requires the translation of a cross sectional area back into a single surface crack length for the 
third model (cumulative cross-sectional area).  This was performed by taking the POD curves 
derived for cross sectional area in Figure 5.5-19 and expressing the cross sectional area axis in 
the scale of a single surface crack length to yield the area, as shown in Figure 6.0-1 for the 
resultant POD curves. 
 
 
Figure 6.0-1.  Estimated POD curves of Figure 5.5-19 with the x-axis transformed to the single surface 
crack length yielding the cross-sectional area estimates.  
 
A comparison of Figures 5.5-19 and 5.5-13 shows a reasonably close agreement at the 0.2 Vpp 
threshold for the two POD curves.  However, as the thresholds were relaxed (increasing the 
inspection sensitivity), there was not as much movement in the upper portion of the curves for 
those derived from the cumulative area model (Figure 5.5-19).  The ܽଽ଴ estimated sizes tended to 
be larger for the models fit to the cumulative area data and the 95 percent confidence bounds 
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tended to be somewhat tighter.  Summary values for the ܽ90 estimate and confidence bounds for 
all three models are contained in Table 6.0-1. 
A measure of the “goodness of the fit” to the various regression models was provided by the 
standard deviation estimated for the residuals of the peak-to-peak voltages about the mean levels.  
The estimated standard deviations were: max crack-0.071; cumulative crack-0.181; cross-
sectional area-0.092.  The cumulative crack model provided the most conservative model, but 
was also the poorest fit.  The maximum crack length model provided a better fit than the cross 
sectional area model, but it should be noted that the handling of the larger crack sizes in the two 
models was different.  Some of the larger cracks were removed from the analysis with respect to 
the largest crack size as they were beyond where the linear assumption continued to hold.  
However, the larger cracks were retained in the cross sectional area analysis, but were limited to 
the maximum area used as a basis for the analysis. 
Table 6.0-1.  Summary of ࢇૢ૙ Estimates and Uncertainty 
 ܽ90 estimate 95 percent CI for ܽ90 
Hit/miss Inspector 1 0.011 [0.009, 0.014]
Max flaw model (inch/mm)
Thresh = 0.200, FC estimate =0.0003 0.028/0.71 [0.026, 0.030]
Thresh = 0.135, FC estimate =0.01 0.021/0.53 [0.019, 0.023]
Thresh = 0.101, FC estimate =0.05 0.017/0.43 [0.015, 0.019]
Thresh = 0.084, FC estimate =0.10 0.015/0.38 [0.013, 0.017]
Cumulative flaw lengths (inch/mm)
Thresh = 0.337, FC estimate =0.01 0.097/2.46 [0.087, 0.112]
Thresh = 0.214, FC estimate =0.05 0.079/2.01 [0.070, 0.091]
Thresh = 0.200, FC estimate =0.06 0.076/1.93 [0.068, 0.088]
Thresh = 0.159, FC estimate =0.10 0.069/1.75 [0.061, 0.080]
Single flaw length corresponding to cross-sectional area model (inch/mm) 
Thresh = 0.200, FC estimate =0.002 0.029/0.74 [0.027, 0.030]
Thresh = 0.158, FC estimate =0.01 0.026/0.66 [0.025, 0.028]
Thresh = 0.111, FC estimate =0.05 0.023/0.58 [0.021, 0.025]
Thresh = 0.089, FC estimate =0.10 0.021/0.53 [0.020, 0.023]
7.0 Findings and NESC Recommendations 
A POD study was conducted on cracked poppet simulators that replicated the behavior of flight 
MPS GH2 FCV poppets.  The critical characteristics of the FCV poppet were replicated in poppet 
simulators that were cracked using a specially designed loading fixture.  The cracked poppet 
simulators were examined with a SEM to determine the length and location of all cracks greater 
than 0.001 inches (0.03 mm).  A total of 55 cracked poppet simulators were created for the POD 
study with crack sizes that ranged from 0.001 to more than 0.1 inches (0.03 to 2.54 mm). 
The measurements for the POD study were performed by two inspectors with identical EC 
systems with each inspector conducted six examinations of each poppet simulator.  The results of 
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the POD study recommend the continued used of a peak-to-peak output response voltage 
threshold of 0.2. 
7.1  Findings 
F-1. Two independent inspectors performed EC NDE inspections on 55 poppet simulators and 
detected all cracks that exceeded 0.01 inches (0.25 mm) in surface length. 
F-2. A POD analysis was conducted that indicates the threshold of 0.2 volt for the signal 
strength that was initially recommended results in an inspection that is capable of finding 
cracks greater than 0.030 inches (0.76 mm) with probability exceeding 0.90.  This 
capability has been established at a 95 percent confidence level.  Estimated false call 
rates at this threshold level are small (< 0.002). 
F-3. Cracks smaller than 0.030 inches (0.76 mm) are capable of being found by lowering the 
threshold from 0.2 volts, but with a tradeoff of increasing the false call rate. 
F-4. The size and shape of the cracks that were detected in the poppet simulators were 
qualitatively similar in size and shape to the crack found in the failed flight poppet from 
STS-126. 
F-5. The presence of multiple cracks in a small region had little or no influence on the EC 
findings. 
F-6. The POD analysis found that the EC response was best characterized by the length of the 
largest crack in a region.   
7.2  NESC Recommendations 
R-1. The inspection of the SSP Orbiter MPS GH2 FCV poppets should continue to use the  
0.2 volt threshold as the accept/rejection criteria, as evaluated with the UniWest US 1779 
bolt rotation device/scanner and a model US 1839 probe EC system, unless a critical 
crack size less than 0.030 inch (0.76 mm) is identified.1 (F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4, F-5, and  
F-6) 
a. If this crack length cannot be tolerated then the threshold will need to be re-
examined and lowered to a level that balances the risks of passing a small crack 
with the estimated false call rate.  
R-2. New inspectors2 and/or EC inspections systems should be evaluating using the dataset of 
characterized cracked poppet simulators created during this study. (F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4, 
F-5, and F-6) 
                                                 
1
Program has already moved to using a lowered detection threshold as well as assessing changes in signal response before and after testing or 
flight as part of the criteria to identify crack indications. 
2
NASA STD-5009 states that the period of certification for a special NDE procedure/inspector is 3 years.  Thus, the inspectors would need to be 
re-certified within 3 years. 
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8.0 Alternate Viewpoints 
There were no alternate viewpoints during the course of this assessment. 
9.0 Other Deliverables 
There are no other deliverables after the final report is completed and approved by the NRB. 
10.0 Lessons Learned 
No applicable lessons learned were identified for entry into the NASA Lessons Learned 
Information System (LLIS). 
11.0 Definition of Terms  
Corrective Actions  
Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, training, inspections, 
tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, equipment, facilities, resources, or material that 
result in preventing, minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
Finding  
A conclusion based on facts established during the assessment/inspection by the investigating 
authority.  
Lessons Learned  
Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may be positive, as in a 
successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap or failure. A lesson must be significant in 
that it has real or assumed impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically 
correct; and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision that reduces or 
limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a positive result.  
Observation  
A significant factor established during this assessment that supports and influences the 
conclusions reached in the statement of Findings and Recommendations.    
 
Off-Nominal Surface 
Off-nominal surface is defined as a surface finish that does not meet specification/drawing 
requirements. 
Problem  
The subject of the independent technical assessment/inspection. 
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Recommendation  
An action identified by the assessment/inspection team to correct a root cause or deficiency 
identified during the investigation.  The recommendations may be used by the responsible 
C/P/P/O in the preparation of a corrective action plan.  
 
Repliset 
A tough, flexible mold material that is used to obtain high-resolution replicas of engineering 
surfaces for microscopic surface examinations. 
 
Root Cause  
Along a chain of events leading to a mishap or close call, the first causal action or failure to act 
that could have been controlled systemically either by policy/practice/procedure or individual 
adherence to policy/practice/procedure. 
12.0 Acronyms List 
AS&M Analytical Systems and Materials, Inc. 
CFD  Computational Fluid Dynamics 
EC  Eddy Current 
EDM  Electro-Discharge Machining 
ET  External Tank 
FCV   Flow Control Valve 
GH2  Gaseous Hydrogen 
HRC  Hardness Rockwell C 
IACS  International Annealed Copper Standard 
JSC  Johnson Space Center 
LaRC  Langley Research Center 
LV    Launch Vehicle 
LH2  Liquid Hydrogen 
MPS   Main Propulsion System 
MTSO  Management and Technical Support Office 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDE  Nondestructive Evaluation 
NESC  NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NRB   NESC Review Board 
OV  Orbiter Vehicle 
POD  Probability of Detection 
rpm  Revolutions per Minute 
SEM  Scanning Electron Microscope 
SEO  Systems Engineering Office 
SSME  Space Shuttle Main Engine 
SSP  Space Shuttle Program 
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STS  Space Transportation System 
TDT  Technical Discipline Team 
Vpp  Volts – peak to peak 
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